Iraq War Was Precluded: UN Negotiation Charade

Today's Washington Post has an article "From Memos, Insights Into Ally's Doubts On Iraq War: British Advisers Foresaw Variety of Risks, Problems" which analyzes more of the eight memos released to the public by British journalist Michael Smith in which British officials cast doubt upon the American plan to invade Iraq.

On March 25, 2002, two weeks before Blair met with Bush in Crawford, TX, back in the spring of 2002, British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw wrote, "The rewards from your visit to Crawford will be few. The risks are high, both for you and for the Government."

Ten days before Straw, on March 14, 2002, David Manning, Blair's chief foreign policy adviser at the time, wrote to the prime minister, "I think there is a real risk that the administration underestimates the difficulties. They may agree that failure isn't an option, but this does not mean they will necessarily avoid it."

Reporter Glen Frankel continues,

Critics of the Bush administration contend the documents -- including the now-famous Downing Street Memo of July 23, 2002 -- constitute proof that Bush made the decision to go to war at least eight months before it began, and that the subsequent diplomatic campaign at the United Nations was a charade, designed to convince the public that war was necessary, rather than an attempt to resolve the crisis peacefully. They contend the documents have not received the attention they deserve.

(Click here to read the full article.)

Thomas Friedman: Run, Dick, Run

In "Run, Dick, Run," which ran in today's New York Times, columnist Thomas Friedman provides more insightful analysis than of late into an important, as-yet undiscussed facet of Republican Party politics: the (apparent) lack of a successor for US President George W. Bush.

(Click here to read the full article.)